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COMMENT:
RECURRENT PATTERNS OF FAMILY LAW
R. H.

HELMHOLZ*

A commentator whose work in the "law of intimate associations" has been primarily historical should not enter directly
into criticism of proposals to change the law. He is apt to take
the part of the grumbler. He will too quickly dismiss some
ideas because they are untried. He will too quickly dismiss
others because he has seen them, or their like, somewhere
before in the historical record and found their results unfortunate. The commentator will thereby miss what is important in
the proposals advanced in articles like Mr. Temple's.'
To recognize a natural propensity to err, however, is not to
say that some historical comparisons entail great risk. They
may be profitable, and they can hardly be unfitting. In fact, the
situation described by Mr. Temple does not seem altogether
unparalleled. Some of its elements, such as the large scale entry of women into the marketplace and the acceptance of "alternative life-styles," do seem genuinely novel. However, the
broad patterns described present some recurrent, and even important, patterns in family law. Therein, for this commentator,
has been the value of Mr. Temple's article. It calls to mind patterns that are recurrent in the context of developments that are
unprecedented.
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN LEGAL RULE AND COMMON USAGE

The first recurrent pattern is the emergence of a sharp separation of family law from the realities of family life. Mr. Temple
notes that recent years have witnessed an increasing disparity
between the law's assumptions and society's practices, and he
holds that this divergence requires something like the proposal
he advances. His proposal may be good. For someone who
knows something about the history of the subject, however, the
divergence itself is not very startling. It has happened before.
Probably no area of the law ever matches human life perfectly,
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., Princeton University, 1962; LL.B.,
Harvard Law School, 1965; Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1970.
1. Temple, Freedom of Contractand Intimate Relationships, 8 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121
(1985).
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but family law has always seemed particularly prone to fall out
of joint with the perceptions and desires of the men and women whose lives are regulated by it.
One of the most striking examples of this divergence comes
from the dawn of the modern era of family law, the Twelfth
Century. The law that regulated the formation of marriage, the
canon law, adopted a rule that if a man and a woman both uttered present words of consent ("I take thee as my husband2
[wife]"), they had entered into a valid and indissoluble union.
No ecclesiastical ceremony, no parental approval, no negotiations about property, not even subsequent sexual relations
were required to make them man and wife. It was a purely consensual doctrine of what made a valid marriage.
This rule of the canon law bound all Christians, which is to
say, all but the smallest part of the medieval population. In
theory, disobedience meant excommunication, entailing exclusion from virtually all civil rights, and, at least in places, actual
imprisonment until the person excommuniciated was brought
to at least nominal compliance with the canonical rules.3 However, the consensual view of marriage adopted by the canon law
did not carry the day with a large part of European society. Recent research has shown that most people continued to hold to
an older tradition, in which consummation was required to
make a marriage complete, in which the family had a legitimate
though not absolute say in their children's choice of spouse,
and in which the settlement of property was a normal part of a
marriage agreement.4 In short, family law and common assumptions about marriage fell out of joint. There was a lay
view, real but largely inarticulate, 5 that a true marriage re6
quired more than the simple consent of the man and woman.
2. See Decretales Gregorii IX, Lib. IV, titl. 1, caps. 9-10, in 2 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI
663-64 (A. Friedberg ed. 1879). The text somewhat simplifies a development which
was more complicated. The law contained several exceptions, and the consensual rule
was not without precedent. See generally 1 A. EsMEIN, LE MARIAGE EN DROIT CANONIQUE
35-137 (1891).
3. See generally F. LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR ARM IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND (1968).
4. See G. DuBY, LE CHEVALIER, LA FEMME ET LE PRETRE (1981), trans as THE KNIGHT,
THE LADY AND THE PRIEST (1983); see also 8J. FAMILY HIST. (1983), a special issue devoted to religion and the family, including a full bibliography of recent work.
5. The tradition is not completely inarticulate; see, e.g., H. EMANUEL, THE LATIN
TEXTS OF THE WELSH LAws 141-46, 341-45 (1967).
6. The parallel example provided by modem attitudes toward contraception among
Roman Catholic laymen, while not exact, is instructive.
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What is arresting is that this divergence continued for
centuries.
The process by which partial accommodation between these
seemingly irreconcilable views was worked out belongs to historical inquiry, not to this commentary, but for present purposes it is instructive to view the present situation in light of
this historical context. There is little doubt that the divergence
now exists. 7 With few exceptions, American law continues to
regard marriage entered into with state sanction as the sole legitimate form of union between man and woman. It bestows
special privilege on that sort of union alone, and it refuses to
cross the threshold of the family home, assuming that custom
and mutual accommodation will regulate what goes on inside.
In such a regime divorce represents failure, not something to
be expected and planned for.
This traditional marriage law, however, no longer represents
something everyone accepts. If it once squared with reality, it
does so no longer. Mr. Temple holds that this divergence requires a change in our ways of dealing with the marriage bond.
He makes a good case for it, but from an historical perspective
the situation is less disquieting than he assumes. The emerging
divergence between law and societal assumptions is an example
of the same sort of divergence that emerges from time to time
in family law. The details are different. The broad pattern is
the same.
THE NATURE OF LEGAL RESPONSE

To see a common pattern in family law does not, of course,
compel inaction. It does not mean that there is no serious
problem to be met. Lawmakers have rightly advanced reform
proposals in the past, and Mr. Temple suggests they must do
so today. His proposal, I think, fits a second recurring pattern
in the history of family law. Where there is rift between legal
rule and social reality, lawmakers determined to do something
about it have gone about their task indirectly, rather than by
meeting it head-on. The legal standard is thought too important an ideal to discard, but the divergence from practice is too
sharp not to deal with somehow. The result is a compromise.
7. See generally M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 1-9 (1977).
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Such was the case with the early marriage law just discussed.
Lawyers regularly affirmed the pure consensualist doctrine of
marriage as the rule of law, and the courts of the Church regularly applied it.8 However, various responses recognizing the
lay view were also adopted. Take the question of parents' influence over their children's marriages. The canon law did not
allow the father any direct say. Instead, the lawmakers adopted
a rule that distinguished between fully licit marriages and those
that were valid but illicit. In order for a marriage to be fully
licit the marriage had to be celebrated in the presence of witnesses, preceded by public reading of the banns, and solemnly
blessed by a priest. Anything less was held to be clandestine
and subjected the contracting parties to public penance,
though the validity and enforceability of the marriage were not
affected.9
The canon law's full approval, in other words, was reserved
for deliberate and formal marriages. Into such a regime, family
influence and property settlement more easily fit. The publicity and delay could readily accommodate the interests and the
influences of persons other than the contracting couple. The
law did not take direct account of such outside forces. It did
not require parental consent, even for the marriages of minor
children. It simply left room and time for those interests, and
societal habits and family wishes took advantage of the opening
provided.'o
Is not the proposal that contracts can provide the best way to
accommodate changing patterns of married life something like
the same thing? Vastly different in detail though it is, it fits the
same pattern. Rather than accepting, for example, a new type
of relationship of sexual union without formal marriage, the
proposal is to let all who enter into such unions contract for
themselves about what its terms will be. The proposal essentially leaves the definition of marriage as it is, but indirectly
permits informal unions by broadening the scope of contract
law.
8. See R. H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 25-73 (1974).
9. See Decretales Gregorii IX, Lib. IV, tit. 3, cap. 3, in 2 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI. supra
note 2, at 679; for England, see the Provincial constitution or statute of Archbishop
Simon Mepham (1328), PROVINCIALE (seu Constitutiones Angliae) 273 (W. Lyndwood ed.
1679).
10. See Donahue, The Canon Law on the Formation of .arniage and Social Practicein the
Later Middle Ages, 8J. FAMILY HIsT. 144 (1983).
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It would be possible for a responsible reformer to propose direct recognition of a new type of union. Roman law knew
something very much like it: concubinage, a union which did
not have the pejorative connotations later ages associated with
it.l" From such a proposal a new semi-marital status might be
fashioned. However, no one advances such a direct solution.
Instead, what lawyers propose is to allow the development to
occur, even to promote it, by slightly expanding the law of contracts and by slightly narrowing the public policy against fornication and adultery. This may in fact be the best way to
proceed. Certainly contract law has enough inherent flexibility
to take such a development in stride,' 2 and consensus about
what should be the incidents of a newly recognized status of
semi-married partners would be difficult to achieve. Equally
certainly, the proposal fits the common historical pattern of
family law development by dealing with divergence between
law and reality by indirection.
Much the same can be said for what is the most controversial
aspect of Mr. Temple's article-his advocacy of the use of contracts to regulate domestic duties, spousal vacations, income
production, and the like. He urges the use of such contracts
and their recognition by our legal system. He marshalls reputable opinion to show that such contracts would actually promote harmony at home, and he believes that our legal system
would not in fact be overwhelmed with petty lawsuits if courts
were to enter this presently untouched area of human life.
The impetus for this proposal is the movement for legal
equality between the sexes, coupled with the entry into the
world of business (and out of the family home) of large numbers of women. The wisdom of such a proposal may be open
to doubt. Certainly some doubt it. 13 That is not for me to say.
I mean only to point out the indirectness of the way it meets
the problem. The proposal does not suggest that the law adopt
equality as a rule for domestic relations. Something like an expanded and more rigorous community property system might
issue from direct acceptance of the new developments. In11.

See P.

MEYER. DER ROMISCHE KONKUBINAT NACH DEN RECHTSQUELLEN UND DEN

INSCHRIFIEN (1895).

12. The example of the requirement of consideration and the enforcement of gifts in
(onteniflation of marriage come to mind. See A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON
OF CONTRACT 418-21 (1975).
L,%%V

13. Soe.e.g.. H.

KRAVSE.

FAMILY LAW 100 (2d ed. 1983).

HeinOnline -- 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 179 1985

HarvardJournalof Law and Public Policy

[Vol. 8

stead, Mr. Temple suggests that it would be preferable to meet
the problem by applying an existing body of contract law to
domestic regulation and disputes. If the fit is not exact (and he
shows that in its current form the law of contracts is not quite
suitable for the task assigned), nevertheless contract law can be
stretched and reformed to meet most of the needs of working
spouses. It does not necessarily follow that greater equality, freedom and happiness will prevail in such contracts, but at least
that seems the likely outcome. Equality, freedom and happiness
are the goals of the proposal, and Mr. Temple's notion is that
they will follow indirectly but surely from the use of such
contracts.
THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES

Things do not always work out as planned, in law and in life,
and the results of changes in legal rules regulating family law
are a rich mine of examples of the unexpected consequence.
Professor S. F. C. Milsom has recently demonstrated this in discussing the origins of the early common law rules governing
inheritance by women.' 4 No one intended them to take exactly
the form they did. They were .the by-products of other, more
directly desired, legal changes. This is not, of course, an invariable rule. Not everything occurs by chance. But the pattern in
which the adoption of one legal rule gives rise to results that
are not expected, or even acceptable, to the formulators of the
rule has been a common one in the history of family law. It is
common enough that we should not be surprised if the use of
contracts to govern relations in the home repeated it.
The history of the canon law of marriage discussed above
provides an instructive example. The canon lawyers who developed the distinction between valid and licit marriages must
have thought of it as a sensible compromise between the pure
consensualist view of marriage and the evident need for safeguards recognizing society's needs and interests. Doubtless
they expected that the publicly celebrated marriage would be
the norm, while the law preserved the ideal that marriage depended solely on consent, not family approval or sexual relations. To some extent their hopes were realized in the
14. Inheritanceby Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries, in ON TlE LAWS
60 (M. Arnold, T.
Green, S. Scully, & S. White, eds. 1981).
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE

HeinOnline -- 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 180 1985

No. 1]

Family Law

developments of the later Middle Ages.' 5 However, the distinction they arrived at had at least one unintended consequence. It meant that many marriages, privately entered into
and valid in the eyes of God and the couple, could not be
proved in a public court because they had been made privately,
without witnesses. Where one of the parties to such a private
marriage subsequently married someone else in public, only
the second marriage could be proved in a public court. Hence
the prior, and theoretically valid marriage, would fail a court
test if one party disavowed it. The courts of the Church had
therefore to uphold as legitimate the subsequent, public marriage even though such marriages were in truth no more than
perpetual adultery. Because laymen did not accept the consensualist rule, the problem was exacerbated. Laymen took advantage of the rules of proof to avoid the canon law's rule of what
constituted a valid marriage, and thereby left the Church in the
unexpected position of enforcing what were, canonically speaking, sinful marriages.' 6 That consequence followed naturally,
but unexpectedly, from the rules the Church adopted to narrow the divergence between law and society's expectations.
Would similar unexpected consequences attend the adoption
of Mr. Temple's suggestion that contracts offer a promising
way of dealing with current family law problems? I suspect so.
No one has powers of divination, I admit. It is impossible to
know with certainty what consequences would attend the adoption of the article's proposals. Nonetheless, some unintended
consequences probably would arise, and it may be worth speculating briefly on a few of the possibilities.
One is that courts will be encouraged to look even further
into the fairness of antenuptial property settlements than they
currently do. If courts get into the business of enforcing domestic contracts between husband and wife, they will almost
certainly have to do so with an expanded view of the doctrines
of unconscionability and overreaching. Mr. Temple advocates
an expanded inquiry into the fairness of contracts regulating
intimate associations, and he is right to do so. The nature of
the marriage tie-intimate, continuing, and changing-re15. Sheehan, The Formation and Stability of .1arriage in Fourteenth-Century England: Evidence of an Ely Register, 33 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 228 (1971).
16. See. e.g., Brundage, Concubinage and .Marriage in ledieval Canon Law, IJ. MEDIEVAL
HisT. 1. 8-9 (1975).

HeinOnline -- 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 181 1985

182

HarvardJournalof Law and Public Policy

[Vol. 8

quires it. But can a satisfactory line be drawn between contracts for division of property at death or divorce and contracts
regulating the details of married life? They are likely to be
made at the same time, even in the same document. Or would
the line be crossed by courts looking closely'into the details of
property settlements, taking into account how things have
worked out, to insure that both parties were getting a fair
shake? There are signs already of how tempting courts find the
prospect, 17 and an unexpected consequence of the widespread
use and enforcement of "contracts of intimate association"
might well be the destruction of the rule that prenuptial agreements will be enforced according to their terms as long as there
has been full disclosure at the time of contracting.
A second possibility is that the proposal's adoption would
have a considerable impact on the law of contracts itself.
Traditional common law allows only a small role to specific
performance; money damages have always been the rule. However, if courts are to enforce domestic contracts, they are almost bound to move in the opposite direction. If a couple
agrees that each will have a three-week vacation, any court
called upon to enforce that agreement will have to enforce it by
means which amount to specific performance, whether this is
by penal damages, a negative injunction, or direct order. Ordinary money damages make no sense. If this happens, what becomes of the argument that specific performance cannot be
awarded in ordinary contract cases because courts will not impose, and cannot supervise, continuing personal service contracts? Regular enforcement of marriage agreements, the most
intimate of all personal service contracts, will make the old law
suspect. This is not necessarily bad. There may be signs of it
already.'" But it would be an unintended consequence of a
change of law made for quite a different reason.
A third possibility is that the proposal might actually lead to
restrictions on divorce. This would be the most unintended
consequence of all, but it is possible. No contract would be
easier for a couple in love to sign than one which put some
teeth into the promise "to have and to hold till death do us
17. See, e.g., In re Estate of Edsell, 447 So.2d 263 (Fla. App. 1983); Matter of Estate of
Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193 (1982); Eule v. Eule. 24 Il1. App. 3d 83, 320
N.E. 2d 506 (1974); Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978).
18. See Burrows, Specfic Performance at the Crossroads, 4 LEGAL STUDIES: THlE JOURNAL
OF THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW 102 (1984).
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part." The churches, the most likely drafters of the form-type
marriage contracts most couples would doubtless use, might
naturally favor some such restriction. If state-declared public
policy is to give way to enforcement of agreements between
spouses, why should they not be free to restrict their own right
to divorce? Such agreements would not need to contain absolute prohibitions against divorce; they might merely limit the
right to a given set of circumstances or make provision for
post-divorce support that would make divorce impractical. The
law of recent years has seen the emergence of a "right to
marry," but it does not necessarily follow that there is a constitutional right to desert and remarry.' 9 Its main prop so far has
been public policy declared by statute. If that falls to a regime
of free contract, the way would be opened to a result its proponents would find most incongruous: the tie that binds by law as
well as by moral force.
Against such a result loud voices would be raised. Perhaps it
could happen only if there were a real shift in moral sentiment.
But such things have occasionally occurred. Intimate associations have always had a life of their own, one beyond the power
of legislators to control, or commentators to predict. This
most important area of human life has often moved in response
to forces that are beyond the law's power to dictate. Sometimes we cannot even describe them with accuracy. Recurrent
patterns in the history of family law show, above all, how resistant our conduct is to regulation from outside.

19. See Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Of course, such a constitutional right
could conceivably be fashioned, using. for example. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1970) and Redhall v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061 (E.D. Wis. 1976).

HeinOnline -- 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 183 1985

HeinOnline -- 8 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 184 1985

